Bankruptcy: Enforcing a Chapter XIII Wage Earner\u27s Plan over the Objection of a Secured Creditor by Bolles, Donald
BANKRUPTCY: ENFORCING A CHAPTER
XIII WAGE EARNER'S PLAN OVER THE
OBJECTION OF A SECURED CREDITOR.
As part of a petition under Chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy
Act, Edward Cheetham submitted a wage earner's plan' to a referee
in bankruptcy. Although Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. [hereinaf-
ter referred to as C.I.T.] was listed as a secured creditor in Cheeth-
am's plan, no further mention was made of the corporation. C.I.T.
rejected the plan and proposed to take back its security, an
automobile in Cheetham's possession. The referee confirmed the
plan over C.I.T.'s objection and denied C.I.T.'s petition for
reclamation. Upon appeal, the district court reversed on the
grounds that C.I.T.'s acceptance was a condition precedent to
proper confirmation of the plan. In its opinion, the court focused
on the following provision of Chapter XI I I:
[A wage earner's plan may not be confirmed until] it has been
accepted in writing... by the secured creditors whose claims are
dealt with by theplan.2
The lower court interpreted the statutory words broadly,
holding, in effect, that all secured creditors were "dealt with" unless
the plan expressly provided for payment to the rejecting secured
creditor in strict accordance with the terms of his contract. The
court reasoned that once a plan was confirmed, there were
numerous ways in which a Chapter XI I I proceeding might permit a
I. A Chapter XIII Wage Earner's Plan is a federal statutory alternative to ordinary
bankruptcy. Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1001-86 (1964). Its remedy is limited
to the working man, (i.e. one who earns his livelihood by wages, salary or commissions).
Two major features of the remedy are that (1) it is voluntary for the debtor, and (2) debts are
paid out of future wages. By contrast, "straight" bankruptcy involves a liquidation of the
bankrupt's assets, distributing the proceeds to his creditors. Under Chapter XI 11, the debtor
usually keeps all of his property, but, with the assistance of an attorney, formulates a plan
whereby his creditors are repaid out of expected earnings. Payments are distributed through
a court-appointed trustee over a period, generally, not to exceed three years. The usual case
involves an extension-in-time of his debts, although there are provisions for a composi-
tion. Hence the statutory remedy is an attempt to rehabilitate a working man who has
hopelessly over-extended his credit, yet honestly desires to repay his debts, rather than
avoid them. For a concise review see Benson, Wage Earner Plans in Bankruptcy Court, 41
MICH. STATE B.J. 10 (1962). For a more thorough treatment see C. NADLER, THE
LAW OF DEBTOR RELIEF, §§ 404-598 (1954) (Supp. 1966). An excellent student comment
appears in Note, Chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act: As .1aine Goes, So Should the Na-
tion, 5 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 329 (1968).
2. Bankruptcy Act, II U.S.C. § 1052(I) (1964) (emphasis added).
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secured creditor's interest to be "affected"; 3 hence it was unrealistic
to claim that he was not being "dealt with." For example, the
bankruptcy court acquires exclusive jurisdiction over the debtor's4
property. Any action a secured creditor might take to reclaim his
security must be approved by that court. Cheetham's plan
contained no provision protecting C.I.T.'s contract rights, and
therefore it was improper to confirm the plan without C.I.T.'s
written acceptance.
Cheetham appealed to the First Circuit Court of Appeals, held,
reversed. The lower court erroneously looked outside of the plan to
find ways in which C.I.T. had been "realistically" dealt with.' The
First Circuit court adopted the narrow interpretation of "dealt
with" to limit its meaning to a situation in which the adverse effect
upon a secured creditor appeared on the face of the plan. Cheeth-
am did not "deal with" C.I.T. because he elected not to do so in
his plan. Accordingly, written acceptance by a secured creditor was
not a prerequisite to confirmation unless the plan expressly limited
the amount recoverable on the secured claim or restricted the se-
curity interest.
The adverse effects considered by the district court arose
from operation of the Bankruptcy Law, not from the plan as such.
Adequate protection of the interests of non-assenting secured
3. The lower court in Cheethan used the word "affected" synonymously with "dealt
with." In re Cheetham, 272 F. Supp. 501, 505 N.7 (D. Me. 1967).
4. One who files a petition under Chapter XIII is, in accordance with the objectives of
the statute, designated "debtor" rather than a "bankrupt" to avoid the stigma attached to
that term. Bankruptcy Act, II U.S.C. § 1002 (1964).
5. The district court enumerated several ways in which C.I.T. was "affected" and
therefore "dealt with":
[C]osts of administration, and claims of assenting secured creditors had priority
over claims of nonassenting secured creditors; nonassenting secured creditors
would receive payment only after their claims were "perfected and established,"
and then only "in such a manner as may be proved or allowed" by the court; and
payments could be temporarily reduced or suspended by the court without notice
to the creditors.
Cheetham v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 390 F.2d 234, 236 (1st Cir. 1%8).
What this amounted to was an enumeration of statutory provisions which authorized a
secured creditor's interest to be affected. Cheetham attempted to avoid the result reached by
the lower court by inserting the following provision in his plan:
Secured claims; Nothing is proposed by this plan which may materially and
adversely affect the interest of any creditor having a valid security interest in any
of the debtor's property. Any secured claim, as proved and allowed which may
be materially and adversely affected, shall not be dealt with by this plan until
such time as a written acceptance from such creditor is filed with the court.
Id. at 235.
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creditors could be furnished by proceedings subsequent to
confirmation. The mere inconvenience of having to resort to such
proceedings should not be sufficient grounds to preclude
confirmation. Cheetharn v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 390
F.2d 234 (1st Cir. 1968).
I. Purpose of the Wage Earner's Plan
In the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, there was no effective
provision for the wage earner who desired to pay his debts through
composition or extension.6 Chapter XIII of the Bankruptcy Act,
popularly known as the Wage Earner's Plan, filled this gap by
providing the working man with a statutory remedy whereby he
could repay his debts through an amortization program.7 By means
6. Jan. 11, 1933 President Hoover noted the fundamental weakness of the Act.
Under existing law, even where majorities of the creditors desire to arrange fair
and equitable readjustments with their debtors, their plans may not be
consummated without prohibitive delay and expense, usually attended by the
obstruction of minority creditors who oppose such settlements in hope that the
fear of ruinous liquidation will induce the immediate settlement of their claims.
H.R. Doc. No. 522, 72d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1933).
The Supreme Court also noted this weakness.
Although statutory relief for the financially distressed wage earner had been
available to some extent as early as the Bankruptcy Act of 1867, 14 Stat. 517,
Congress found in its study prior to the 1938 revision of the bankruptcy laws
that there were no effective provisions- for the complete repayment of the wage
earner's debts suited to his problems. . . . For example, compositions under
§ 12 of the 1898 Act, 30 Stat. 549, were available to the wage earner, but the
relief afforded was unsatisfactory. Section 12 proceedings, which were primarily
adaptable for use by business entities, were disproportionately expensive in view
of the small sums ordinarily involved in wage-earner cases; they lacked
flexibility; and they did not provide for jurisdiction of the court subsequent to
confirmation.
Perry v. Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392, 394 (1966).
See also, In re Perry, 272 F. Supp. 73, 77-83 (D Me. 1967).
7. Chapter XIII was enacted as part of President Franklin Roosevelt's "forgotten
man" program which he promised the country in his campaign for president in 1932. See
Haden, Chapter XIII 'Wage Earner Plans-Forgotten Man Bankruptcy, 55 Ky. L.J. 564
(1967). Generally the Vage Earner's Plan has been advocated by writers as more advan-
tageous to both creditor and debtor than straight bankruptcy. Its existence is based on the
presumption that some if not most wage earners want to pay their debts, thereby maintain-
ing an honorable credit standing. Creditors benefit by full or near full payments as opposed
to virtually no realization of their claims under a normal bankruptcy proceeding in which
the debtor has no assets. See note 10 infra. See generally Hilliard & Hurt, Wage Earn-
er Plans Under Chapter XIH of the Bankruptcy Act, 19 Bus. LAW. 271 (1963); Nadler,
Rehabilitation of the Insolvent Wage Earner Under the Bankruptcy Act: A Challenge to
Minnesota, 42 MINN. L. REV. 377 (1958); 5 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 329 (1968), supra
note I. Because of these apparent advantages it has been the hope of many writers that, for
wage earners, Chapter XIII would become the rule and bankruptcy the exception. E.g.,
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of the Act, Congress clearly intended to rehabilitate the insolvent
wage earner by encouraging him to pay his debts in full rather than
avoid them by seeking a discharge in straight bankruptcy.' To
accomplish this goal, the statute provided a framework within
which the bankruptcy court could regulate the rights of secured
creditors. 9 Otherwise, a secured creditor would be free to upset a
plan for extension by foreclosing or repossessing his security (even
when the secured property might be essential to the operation of the
plan) and thus probably force the debtor into straight bankruptcy,
to the detriment of other creditors, as well as the debtor.'0
Nevertheless, as one writer maintained, "[t]he trouble courts have
had with the Act makes it evident that the specific intent of
Congress as to secured creditors has not been made clear."' , The
divergent views expressed by the lower and circuit courts in the
instant case exemplify this confusion.
Hilliard & Hurt, supra, at 275.
Today, consumer bankruptcy has reached a critical stage; well over 90% of all the
bankrupticies filed are a result of personal insolvencies rather than business failures. O'Neill,
Wage Earner's Plan, Chapter XIII, 27 FED. BAR J. 157 (1967); 5 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 329,
332 nn.34, 35 (1968) supra note I. Proponents of Chapter XIII advocate a wider use to
reverse the trend before the economy of the country is devastated. See generally Bobier,
Chapter XIII-Mecca or Mirage, 32 THE DETROIT LAWYER 25 (1964); 18 PERSONAL
FINANCE L.Q. REP. 41 (1964); 5 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 329 (1968) supra note I. Contra,
see Walker, Is Chapter XIII a Milestone on the Path to the Wel/are State?, 33 REF, J. 7,
9 (1959). The article academically dissents from the majority of writers to emphasize the
fact that Chapter XIII is not a panacea for all the problems of personal insolvencies. See
also 34 FORDHAM L. REV. 528 (1966), for a student comment concluding that Chapter
XIII is too loosely written and needs revision. The major problem is that the secured credi-
tor's status is not clearly defined.
Despite its wide advocacy, use of the Wage Earner's Plan has been minimal. Less than
17% of the bankruptcy filings in 1967 were Chapter XIII filings. 5 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 329,
344 & n.89 (1968), supra note I. Ignorance of the existence of this remedy has been advanced
as the primary reason for its disuse. C. NADLER, THE LAW OF DEBTOR RELIEF § 381 (1954).
As suggested in 34 FORDHAM L. REV. 528 (1966) supra, the uncertain status of the secured
creditor may be an additional reason for its disuse by those attorneys who are familiar with
the statute. After working diligently on a Chapter XIII petition, if a secured creditor is
allowed to reclaim an essential item of the wage earner's property, forcing him into
bankruptcy, an attorney may hesitate before taking the Chapter XI I I route.
8. Perry v. Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392, 395 (1966).
9. See generally Bankruptcy Act, II U.S.C. §§ 1011, 1014, 1057 (1964). One of the
principal reasons section 12 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was infrequently employed
was because no attempt had been made to regulate the rights of secured creditors. See 6
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 0.03 (14th ed. 1965).
10. Perry v. Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392, 395 (1966). In a majority ofcases the
wage earner has no assets and hence there is little distribution in a straight bankruptcy
proceeding. 5 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 329, 339 & n.63 (1968), supra note 1.
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II. Confirmation of the Plan
Courts often face a dilemma when secured creditors reject a
wage earner's plan. As will be seen, the total impact of the statutory
scheme is that all secured creditors are bound by such plans.
Nevertheless, the statute also requires that any secured
creditor "dealt with" by the plan must give written assent before it
may be confirmed by the court.'2
Essential 'to an adequate appreciation of the problem is an
understanding of how the rejecting secured creditor is affected or
bound by the wage earner's plan. If a secured creditor is omitted
from a plan, either because he rejects it (desiring to reclaim his
security) or because the wage earner elects to deal with him outside
of the plan, he no longer enjoys unlimited freedom to pursue his
rights in an action to foreclose or repossess his security; 3 the
rejecting creditor is constrained to seek approval from the
bankruptcy court. This is true for two reasons: (1) All of the
debtor's property comes under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
court in which a Chapter XI II petition is filed;'4 and (2) that court
has been granted the power to enjoin or stay any act or proceeding
to enforce any lien upon the property of a debtor. 5 When a
protesting secured creditor's petition to reclaim his security is
denied, the reason generally advanced by a court is that retention of
the property by the debtor is necessary to the success of the plan.'6
If the trustee or debtor thereafter elects not to pay the creditor in
accordance with the original agreement, the creditor's only remedy
II. D. COWANS, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE, § 99 (Supp. 1968).
12. Bankruptcy Act, II U.S.C. § 1052(1) (1964).
13. Two provisions of Chapter XI II which limit this freedom are Section 611:
Where not inconsistent with the provisions of this chapter, the court in which the
petition is filed shall for the purposes of this chapter, have exclusive jurisdiction
of the debtor and his property, wherever located, and of his earnings and wages
during the period of consummation of the plan.
and Section 614:
The court may, in addition to the relief provided by section 29 of the Act and
elsewhere under this chapter, enjoin or stay until final decree the commencement
or continuation of suits other than suits to enforce liens upon the property of a
debtor, and may, upon notice and for cause shown, enjoin or stay until final
decree any act or commencement or continuation ofany proceeding to enforce
any lien upon the property of a debtor.
Bankruptcy Act, I I U.S.C. §§ 1011, 1014 (1964).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See. e.g., Hallenbeck v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 323 F.2d 566, 572 (4th Cir.
1963); In re Garrett, 203 F. Supp. 459, 461 (N.D. Ala. 1962).
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is to renew his petition to foreclose or repossess the secured
property.'7 The lower court in Cheetham reasoned that through the
provisions of the statute, the court can adversely affect the rejecting
secured creditor by its exclusive jurisdiction and injunctive powers.
Therefore, it was unrealistic to say that any of the secured creditors
were not being "dealt with."'" The court was persuaded by the
following rule established in In re O'Dell.19
[A] plan proposed Chapter XIII which does not provide for
assumption of executory contracts by the trustee or otherwise
make provision for the payment of the claims of secured
creditors according to the terms of the instrument creating the
debt, does deal with such claims. A plan without such provision
should not be confirmed unless accepted by the secured
creditors. 0
This view makes a secured creditor's contract rights inviolable
in a Chapter XIII proceeding. The legal effect is to grant every
secured creditor a veto power over confirmation of a wage earner
plan, unless the debtor agrees to make full payments according to
his contract.' If the security was vital to the debtor, one which he
could not reasonably sacrifice and still continue his plan, he would
be forced into straight bankruptcy because he could not meet the
demands of the rejecting secured creditor.
2
1
The Wage Earner's Plan was enacted to fulfill the need for a
workable remedy for the rehabilitation of wage-earner debtors. It
would seem inconsistent with this objective to give one secured
creditor the power to upset confirmation of a plan, forcing the
debtor into bankruptcy to the substantial detriment of other
creditors. Further, such a veto power would violate the rule of
construction set forth in Perry v. Commerce Loan Co.;23 when the
meaning of words in Chapter XIII lead to absurd or futile results,
the court will look beyond such words to the purpose of the Act. 4
To adopt the lower court's interpretation would seem to lead to an
17. See In re Duncan, 33 F. Supp. 997, 998 (E.D. Va. 1940).
18. Compare In re Cheetham, 272 F. Supp. at 507 with Cheetham v. Universal C.I.T.
Credit Corp., 390 F.2d at 237.
19. 198 F. Supp. 389 (D. Kan. 1961).
20. Id. at 391.
21. Cheetham v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 390 F.2d at 237.
22. See Brown, A Primer on Wage-Earner Plans Under Chapter XIII of the
Bankruptcy Act, 17 Bus. LAW. 682, 690-91 (1962).
23. 383 U.S. 392 (1966).
24. Id. at 400.
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incongruous result-an historical retrogression to a period when no
effective remedies had been devised to rehabilitate the wage earner.
Under Cheetham, a rejecting secured creditor may block
confirmation only if the plan expressly limits his claim or decreases
the value of his security. Conversely, if a majority of unsecured
creditors accept it, a debtor may obtain confirmation over the
objection of a secured creditor by simply omitting any provisions
which adversely affect that secured creditor's interest.
In In re Rutledge,25 for example, the district court found that
the proposed plan would make a rejecting secured creditor,
Worthen Bank & Trust Co., an involuntary participant in the plan.
Although full current payments were to be paid as they fell due, the
referee's order allowed delinquent payments to be made within a
"reasonable length of time." The court avoided giving Worthen a
veto power against confirmation by remanding the case "so that the
plan may be amended so as not to include Worthen in its provisions
"26
Because several prior cases had avoided the problem posed by
O'Dell, the holding in the Cheetham case is not revolutionary. In re
Rutledge permitted a debtor to side-step the otherwise harsh result
of allowing a creditor to defeat the plan. However, this method of
amendment is limited to cases which come to the court on review
prior to confirmation. In re Wilder affirmed confirmation of a
plan which included a protesting secured creditor, Sterchi Brothers
Stores, Inc., but did not provide for two delinquent payments of
$36.75. The court deemed such an alteration of the creditor's
contract merely nominal and applied the principle of de minimis
non curat lex. Still, Cheetham is the first instance in which a court
squarely faced the fact that O'Dell created an unnecessary problem
as to confirmation, and therefore rejected it.2" However, as will be
seen, Cheetham merely postponed C.I.T.'s power to destroy the
plan. The real problem was left unresolved: In order to effectuate
25. 277 F. Supp. 933 (E.D. Ark. 1967).
26. Id. at 936.
27. 225 F. Supp. 67 (M.D. Ga. 1963).
28. Cheetham v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 390 F.2d at 237. A bill which in fact
rejected the O'Dell interpretation was introduced in the House of Representatives on January
17, 1967. However, it died in the House Judiciary Committee. The proposed amendment to
Section 646(2) read as follows:
[I]f any secured creditor does not accept, the provisions of the plan dealing with
his rights shall be excluded from the plan and he shall not be affected thereby.
H.R. 2520, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1967).
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the purpose of the Act, how far may a secured creditor be kept at
bay? When equitable considerations indicate the decision is
reasonable, may a bankruptcy court enjoin a creditor from
foreclosing or repossessing his secured property although the
debtor has not strictly complied with the security agreement?
III. The Injunctive Power
In its dictum, Cheetham affirmed a portion of Hallenbeck v.
Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co.,29 which formulated three prerequisites
for the exercise of the court's power to enjoin a creditor from
foreclosing or repossessing his security. The third precondition,
quoted in Cheetham, is that:
[T]he owner of the secured indebtedness must not be required to
accept less than the full periodic payments specified in his
contract .30
By affirming this requirement, Cheetham is impliedly
guaranteeing that C.I.T. will receive "full periodic payments"
outside of the confirmed plan, or be allowed to reclaim the
automobile (in which case Cheetham may be forced into
bankruptcy). If Mr. Cheetham makes full payments, however, the
court will probably enjoin C.I.T. from repossessing its security.
(A) Precondition of 'fullperiodicpayments."
Hallenbeck articulated a rule of law which the majority of
prior Chapter XIII cases had adhered to in principle? In In re
Copes,32 the same court which decided O'Dell, held that a rejecting
secured creditor was entitled either to the benefits of his contract or
the return of his security.33 Two other cases were in substantial
agreement on this point?'
29. 323 F.2d 566 (4th Cir. 1963).
30. Id. at 572 (emphasis added).
[I]n addition to usual equitable considerations, including the debtor's good faith
in submitting a plan and ability to perform it, at least three conditions should be
met before this injunctive power may be exercised: (I) The injunction or stay
must be necessary to preserve the debtor's estate or to carry out the Chapter
XIII plan; (2) the granting of the injunction must not directly or indirectly
impair the security of the lien; and (3) the owner of the secured indebtedness
must not be required to accept less than full periodic payments specified in his
contract. Id.
31. Id.
32. 206 F. Supp. 329 (D. Kan. 1962).
33. Id. at 330.
34. In re Papas, 216 F. Supp. 819, 823 (S.D. Ohio 1962); Interstate Finance Corp. v.
Scrogham, 265 F.2d 889, 891 (6th Cir. 1959).
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Nevertheless, one prior case allowed an injunction to issue
without requiring that all the terms of the secured creditor's
contract be strictly met. The court in In re Duncan35 upheld an
injunction of the referee restraining the seller of a frigidaire from
reclaiming it. The debtor proposed to continue payments of $6.90 a
month, but the seven or eight payments in arrears were not required
to be paid immediately. In effect, the court created an extension-in-
time for the defaulted payments. In meeting the contention that
there was an unconstitutional taking of property in violation of the
fifth amendment, the court cited a Supreme Court case36 which
authorized even greater property rights to be restricted by
restraining a mortgage creditor from foreclosing.
If the Hallenbeck "full periodic payments" requirement
permits an extension of defaulted payments as in Duncan, it admits
that the court has authority to order a reasonable curtailment of the
secured creditor's contract rights in order to prevent a wage earner
plan from failing. On the other hand, if Hallenbeck's precondition
means that all defaulted payments must be paid before a court will
restrain a secured creditor from taking back his security, it adheres
to the O'Dell rationale that the secured creditor's contract rights
are unassailable.
(B) The partially secured creditor.
One argument against the Hallenbeck prerequisite of "full
periodic payments" is that it does not distinguish between a
35. 33 F. Supp. 997, 998-99 (E.D. Va. 1940).
36. Wright v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 502 (1938). The case involved the
constitutionality of Section 75(s) of the Bankruptcy Act, which sought to rehabilitate the
farmer-mortgagor. The Supreme Court declared:
Bankruptcy proceedings constantly modify and affect the property rights
established by state law.
Property rights do not gain any absolute inviolability in the bankruptcy court
because created and protected by state law. Most property rights are so created
and protected. But if Congress is acting within its bankruptcy power, it may
authorize the bankruptcy court to affect these property rights, provided the
limitations of the due process clause are observed.
Id. at 517, 518.
It is suggested that by "due process" the Court means that the creditor must be given notice
and an opportunity to be heard throughout the bankruptcy proceeding, and that adequate
safeguards are provided in order to protect the value of the security.
Certainly the constitutional grant of authority over the subject of bankruptcy permits
Congress to impair contractual obligations in order that the objectives of law may be
achieved. Hanover National Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 188 (1902).
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partially and a fully secured creditor. For example, D owes C
$1,000 which is secured by a reasonably necessary household item,
a refrigerator, valued at $500. The debt is to be paid in monthly
installments of $100 each. Practically speaking, C has a secured
claim of only $500 and an unsecured claim of $500. It would be
unfair to other unsecured creditors for C to be guaranteed $100 a
month when only one-half of the debt is secured." Section 646(1)
of the Bankruptcy Act38 plainly requires that all unsecured debts
be treated alike.39
(C) An injunction may issue when necessary to meet the ends of
equity and justice.
A further argument against the Hallenbeck prerequisite is that
it severely limits the broad injunctive power granted the court to
ensure success of a wage earner's plan. The statute does not specify
when the injunctive power may be utilized. 0 In re Pizzolato4'
provides a broad rule: An injunction may issue when, in the sound
discretion of the court, it is necessary to meet the ends of equity and
justice.42 In that case, Mrs. Pizzolato filed a Chapter XIII petition
in which a bank, as a secured creditor, was technically "dealt
with"; only current full payments of $70 per month were provided
for, but no provision was made for the "balloon payment" of
$435.30 as a final payment. As her payments were in default, the
bank rejected the plan and filed a petition for reclamation. The
referee denied the petition. When the bank sought review on the
order of the referee, the district court affirmed the referee's
injunction but remanded the case for modification of the plan to
require $70 monthly payments to be continued until the "balloon
payment" of $435.30 was paid with interest. The equitable
considerations were as follows:
(1) The security was a three year old Dodge automobile re-
quired by Mrs. Pizzolato to get to work. Her husband was an un-
employed disabled veteran receiving some compensation from the
Veterans Administration.
(2) She had a considerable equity in the automobile.
37. See Brown, supra note 22.
38. Bankruptcy Act, II U.S.C. § 1046(1) (1964).
39. In re Bailey, 188 F. Supp. 47, 49 (N.D. Ala. 196U).
40. See material cited note 13 supra.
41. 268 F. Supp. 353 (W.D. Ark. 1967).
42. Id. at 356.
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(3) Payments to the bank would not be seriously delayed,
hence the bank was not materially and adversely affected.
(4) Mrs. Pizzolato, who was honestly trying to retire her
debts, would be forced into bankruptcy if the bank's petition
were granted.
(5) If she were forced into bankruptcy, the other secured
creditors would recover virtually nothing.
In balancing the interest of a social policy which favors
Chapter XIII (as more beneficial to creditors generally) and the
personal interests of the secured creditor, Pizzolato reasoned that it
was highly unlikely that value of his security would be impaired.
The market price of the automobile was more than double the
amount of the debt. If the plan failed, and the debtor converted her
wage earner plan into an ordinary bankruptcy proceeding, the bank
would almost certainly realize the full amount of its debt.
Admittedly, when a creditor's rights under a security
agreement are denied in order to ensure the success of a wage
earner's plan, it is at the expense of the secured creditor.43 For
example, if Mrs. Pizzolato negligently permitted her automobile
insurance to lapse, and the car was then destroyed, the court's
ruling would reduce the bank to an unsecured status. But if the risk
of loss is minimal, it appears reasonable to allocate this relatively
small burden to the secured creditor rather than place an otherwise
socially useful remedy at his mercy.
Pizzolato demonstrates that when equitable considerations
demand it, the court may permit some delay in the exercise of a
secured creditor's contract rights." Further, the overriding policy
of encouraging the debtor to pay his debts in full, to the general
gain of creditors, may require that the principle, originated in
43. Several courts will not allow the contract rights of a secured creditor to be modified
in a Chapter XIII proceeding, presumably because he has taken the precaution of obtaining
security for his debt, and it must therefore be duly honored. See notes 31-34 supra.
The argument that a denial of rights under a security agreement is at the expense of the
secured creditor would not be valid, however, if the debt was only partially secured.
Realistically, it is to the partially secured creditor's benefit to enjoin him from foreclosing
or repossessing his security. A wage earner's plan carried to a successful completion will give
the partially secured creditor full satisfaction of his debt. Whereas, if he repossesses the
secured property, he realizes only a portion of his debt, and the unpaid portion may never be
satisfied if the debtor should be forced into straight bankruptcy.
44. It is suggested that future courts might find equitable considerations which would
allow them to order partial current payments to a rejecting secured creditor, so long as his
security is not substantially impaired.
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ordinary bankruptcy that the security agreement of a creditor must
be duly honored, be relaxed.
IV. Conclusion
Although the Wage Earner's Plan has been infrequently used,
it offers at least a partial solution to the ever-increasing consumer
bankruptcy problem. Cheetham's interpretation of the statutory
words "dealt with" is one which contributes to a wider use of
Chapter XIII without violating the intent of Congress. The
Cheetham rule permits a debtor to avoid the veto power of a
secured creditor against confirmation by omitting him from the
plan.
Yet by adopting the uncertain Hallenbeck criterion as to when
an injunction may properly issue, Cheetham appears conservative,
tending to protect the strict contractual rights of the secured
creditor. A more flexible rule as declared in Pizzolato seems fair to
the secured creditor without handicapping the effectiveness of the
remedy.
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